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Abstract
This paper brings together analyses of Strict Nash networks under exclusive player
heterogeneity assumption and exclusive partner heterogeneity assumption. This is
achieved through examining how the interactions between these two assumptions
influence important properties of Strict Nash networks. Built upon the findings of
Billand et al (2011) and Galleotti et al (2006), which assume exclusive partner hetero-
geneity and exclusive player heterogeneity respectively, I provide a proposition that
generalizes the results of these two models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network
consists of multiple non-empty components as in Galleotti et al (2006), and (ii) each
non-empty component is a branching or Bi network as in Billand et al (2011). This
proposition requires that a certain restriction on link formation cost (called Uniform
Partner Rankng), which encloses exclusive partner heterogeneity and exclusive player
heterogeneity as a specific case, is satisfied. In addition, this paper shows that value
heterogeneity plays a relatively less important role in changing the shapes of Strict
Nash networks.
JEL Classification : C72, D85
Keywords : Strict Nash Network, Two-way Flow Network, Information Network, Branch-
ing Network, Agent Heterogeneity
1 Introduction
The seminal work of Bala and Goyal (2000), BG henceforth, predicts that in Strict Nash
equilibrium two-way flow non-empty network is a center-sponsored star 1. Such simple
∗First draft : December 2014
1In BG, there are several versions of Strict Nash networks. The version that is used in this paper and
the mentioned literature is the two-way flow model with no decay. That is, information flows to an agent
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form of network emerges as a unique Strict Nash network because several simple assump-
tions are adopted, including agent homogeneity. Naturally, this simplicity has spawned
a vast literature that studies properties of Strict Nash networks under the assumption
of agent heterogeneity. A strand of this literature assumes that heterogeneity resides in
the diversity of link formation cost and value of information that each agent possesses.
This strand of literature can be further divided into two sub-categories. One assumes
that the diversity of link formation cost and value of information depends exclusively on
the identity of link receiver (called exclusive partner hetoregeneity onwards). The other
one assumes that such diversity depends exclusively on the identity of link sender (called
exclusive player hetoregeneity onwards). However, little is known when such one-way
heterogeneity is relaxed. This paper aims to fill in this space in the literature by (i) relaxing
the one-way heterogeneity assumption and, (ii) generalizing the results on properties of
Strict Nash networks found in these two sub-categories of existing literature.
I briefly give an overview of the literature here. For exclusive player heterogeneity,
existence of Nash network and full equilibrium characterization of Strict Nash networks
(SNNs henceforth) are extensively studied by Galleotti et al (2006), Kamphorst and Laan
(2007) and Billand et al (2010). For exclusive partner heterogeneity, full equilibrium char-
acterization and the existence of SNNs are extensively studied by Billand et al (2011) and
Billand et al (2012). However, when two heterogeneities are allowed to interact (called
two-way heterogeneity henceforth) to my knowledge little is known. We know from
Galleotti et al (2006) that SNN under two-way heterogeneity is minimal, and from Haller
et al (2007) that it does not always exist. My attempt to understand the shapes of Strict
Nash networks under the assumption of two-way heterogeneity is thus a major contribu-
tion of this paper to the literature.
By having the goal of bridging the two sub-categories of literature in mind, this paper
provides two propositions that show that the main properties of SNNs found in the models that
assume one-way heterogeneity can be preserved even when two-way heterogeneity is assumed.
I elaborate on these main properties as follows:
1. SNN is a center-sponsored star. This property is found in the original model of BG.
2. SNN is a disconnected network, consisting of many center-sponsored star. This
property is found in the exclusive player heterogeneity model of Galleotti et al
(2006).
3. SNN has a unique component that is a branching or Bi0 , where i0 is the lowest
cost agent. This property is found in the exclusive partner heterogeneity model of
Billand et al (2011).
Consequently, the literature confirms that (1) exclusive player heterogeneity cannot
alter the shape of SNN, yet it splits the connected SNN in BG into many components,
through a link even if he does not sponsor it. Moreover information does not decay even if the path of
information flow contains multiple links
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and (2) conversely, exclusive partner heterogeneity cannot increase the quantity of com-
ponents in SNN, yet it can alter the shape and increase the set of SNNs. This raises the
question of whether both conclusions hold true when the two heterogeneities are allowed
to interact. The result of Proposition 1 in this paper confirms that this is indeed the case,
so long as link formation cost satisfies a certain restriction called Uniform Partner Ranking.
I remark that exclusive partner heterogeneity and exclusive player heterogeneity satisfy
this restriction. Consequently my propositions generalize the Proposition 3.1 of Galleotti
et al (2006) and Proposition 1 of Billand et al (2011).
To further elaborate on this result, I remark that Uniform Partner Ranking, UPR
henceforth, is a sufficient but not necessary condition to predict that every non-empty
component of SNN is a branching or Bi network. Indeed, what warrants a non-empty
component of SNN being a branching or Bi is the existence of a common best partner; an
agent that generates a lowest link formation cost to every other agent in the component
if chosen as a partner. This fact is formally stated as Lemma 4, which becomes the most
important building block of the two propositions in this paper. In Proposition 1, UPR is
simply a restriction on link formation cost that guarantees that a common best partner
exists in every component of SNN. This in turn guarantees that every component of SNN
is a branching or Bi network. I remark that this result is striking, since it shows that
the shape of a component in SNN can be predicted by having a condition (existence of
Common Best Partner in this case) that is much weaker than most of the conditions in
the existing literature such as exclusive partner heterogeneity and exclusive player het-
erogeneity.
Following these findings, this paper seeks to establish Proposition 2 in order to further
eliminate a major difference between Proposition 1 mentioned above and Proposition 1
in Billand et al (2011). This difference is the fact that Uniform Partner Ranking predicts
that non-empty components of SNN are multiple while exclusive partner heterogeneity
predicts that the non-empty component of SNN is unique. To eliminate this difference this
paper proposes a stronger restriction on the structure of link formation cost called Single
Community condition. Using this condition, I establish Proposition 2, which states that
under Single Community condition SNN contains at most one non-empty component that
is a branching or Bi network in which where i is i0, the agent that gives rise to the lowest
link formation cost. I remark further that exclusive partner heterogeneity does satisfy
Single Community condition so that Proposition 2 is also generalization Proposition 1 in
Billand et al (2011).
The paper proceeds as follows. The model and relevant notations are described in
Section 2. In Section 3 I introduce a lemma that shows that if a common best partner
exists then a component of SNN is a branching or Bi network. In Section 4 these lemmas
are put in use to establish Proposition 1 and 2, which are the main results of this paper.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of agents and let i and j be typical members of this set. Each
agent possesses a nonrival distinct piece of information that is valuable both to himself
and anyone who has an entry to it. There are two ways to which a pair of agents can have
an entry to each other’s information: there is a pairwise link between i and j or there is a
series of links where the two ends are i and j.
Link establishment and individual’s strategy. Link establishment is costly and one-
sided. A strategy of i is gi =
{
gi,j : j ∈ N, j 6= i
}
, where gi,j = 1 if i establishes a link with j
and gi,j = 0 otherwise. If gi,j = 1, I say that i accesses j or j receives the link from i. Since all
links form the network, I write g = {gi : i ∈ N} to represent both a strategy profile and a
network.
Network representation. In this paper a node depicts an agent, and an arrow from j
to i represents that j receives a link from i. If all arrows are removed, the network merely
represents how information flows among agents. This structure of information flow is
denoted by g¯ =
{
g¯i,j : i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
, where g¯i,j = 1 if gi,j = 1 or gj,i = 1 or both, and g¯i,j = 0
otherwise.
Information flow. Information of j flows to i directly through a link between i and j,
regardless to who sponsors it. Alternatively, Information of j can also flow to i through a
chain. Formally, a chain between i and j (i 6= j) is a sequence j0, ..., jm such that g¯jl ,jl+1 = 1
for l = 0, ..., m− 1 and j0 = i and jm = j. In this case, I say that i observes j and vice versa.
Costs and benefits If i accesses j, then i pays ci,j. If i observes j, he finds that the
information of j has the value equal to Vi,j 2.
Cost heterogeneity Let C = {ci,j : i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} be a cost structure, C is said to
assume cost homogeneity if ci,j = c for all ci,j ∈ C, and cost heterogeneity if it holds
true that ci,j 6= ck,l for some ci,j, ck,l ∈ C. Cost heterogeneity can be further classified as
follows. If ci,j = ci for all i (ci,j = cj for all j), C is said to assume exclusive player (partner)
heterogeneity. Finally, if ci,j 6= ci for some i and ci,j 6= cj for some j, C is said to assume
two-way heterogeneity.
The payoffs. Let pi : R2 → R be such that pi (x, y) is strictly increasing in x and
strictly decreasing in y. The payoff of player i is given by:
(1a)pii
(
g
)
= pi
 ∑
j∈Ni(g)\{i}
Vij, ∑
j∈Ni(g)\{i}
gi,jcij

where Ni (g) \{i} is the set of all agents that i observes.
Network-related Notations. Recall from the above that a chain from i to j is a se-
quence of distinct players j0, ..., jm such that g¯jl ,jl+1 = 1 for l = 0, ..., m− 1 and j0 = i and
jm = j, a path is defined similarly except that link sponsorship matters. A path from j to
2In the model of BG, Vi,i = Vi,j = K, where K is a constant. However, in this paper Vi,j is left undefined since
our concern is on the appearance of SNN and not on who receives a higher payoff than who. Consequently I
do not include Vi,i in the payoff function. I remark that my reasoning here is in line with that of Billand et al
(2011)
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i is a sequence j0, ..., jm such that gjl ,jl+1 = 1 for l = 0, ..., m − 1 and j0 = i and jm = j. A
cycle is defined in the same fashion as a chain, except that j0 = i and jm = i and all other
players in the sequence are distinct. I use these notations to define the following terms.
A network is connected if there is a chain for every distinct i, j ∈ N. A subnetwork of g
is a network g′ such that g′ ⊂ g. A component of g is a maximal connected subgraph of
g. A component is denoted by D (g). A component is said to be minimal if it contains no
cycle. In a minimal component, every distinct pair of agents is connected by a chain so
that a removal of a link gi,j splits the component into two components - one containing i
and the other one containing j. I denote these two modified components by Di
(
gi,j
)
and
Dj
(
gi,j
)
respectively.
Consider an agent i, Ii (g) and Oi (g) are defined as the set of all links of i that are not
sponsored by i and the set of all links that i establishes respectively 3. If Ii (g) = Oi (g) = 0,
then i is said to be an isolated agent. If every agent in a network is isolated, then the
network is an empty network. If either Ii (g) = 1 or Oi (g) = 1 (but not both), then i is said
to be a terminal agent.
Some important patterns of networks. There are some patterns of networks that are
often referred to, since they emerge as Strict Nash Equilibria. I define them here4. For a
generic set X ⊂ N, let QX = X ∪ {j| there exists a path from j to i for every i ∈ X}. I say
that X is a contrabasis of a network g if it is a minimal set with respect to the property
that QX = N. X is said to be an i-point contrabasis if every j ∈ X accesses i. Furthermore,
if i is a point contrabasis of g and |Ii|≥ 2 but |Ij|< 2 for all j 6= i and j ∈ N, then g is said
to be a Bi network. Observe that in Bi network i is the only agent that receives more than
one link 5. Conversely, if in a network there is no agent that receives more than one link
and there is a unique agent i that receives no link, then the network is called branching
network rooted at i.
Strict Nash Equilibrium. Let g−i denote a strategy profile of all agents except i, ie.,
gi ∪ g−i = g. A best response of an agent i is gi such that pii (gi ∪ g−i) ≥ pii
(
g′i ∪ g−i
)
for
every g′i that is a strategy of i. A strategy profile or a network g is Nash if every agent
plays his best response. A Nash network is a Strict Nash network if the best response of
every agent is unique.
2.1 Cost Structure - Single Community and Uniform Partner Ranking
In the main results section, two propositions that fully characterize the shapes of SNN are
proven, given that SNN satisfies certain restrictions. Here I introduce these restrictions -
uniform partner ranking and single community. Recall that the cost structure C is defined as
C =
{
cij
}
i,j∈N,i 6=j
Definition 1 (Better Partner). Consider a set X ⊂ N and agents j, k ∈ X, j is at least as good
a partner as k with respect to the set X if ci,j ≤ ci,k for any i ∈ X, i 6= j 6= k. Moreover, if the
3 I for incoming and O for outgoing
4The definitions of Bi network and branching network are borrowed from Billand et al (2011)
5Intuitively, Bi is a network such that every agent in the network can be reached through a path to an
agent that accesses i.
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inequality is strict then j is said to be a better partner than k with respect to the set X.
Intuitively, this definition states that if we choose a set X ⊂ N and i ∈ X, then i
can ‘rank’ all agents in this set except himself according to link formation cost that he
potentially has to bear, and such ranking is universal regardless to the identity of agent
i ∈ X. The definition Uniform Partner Ranking below simply adds that the set X = N
Definition 2 (Uniform Partner Ranking). A cost structure C is said to satisfy Uniform Partner
Ranking property if for any distinct pair j, k ∈ N it holds true that j is at least as good a partner
as k or k is at least as a good a partner as j with respect to the set N.
Remarks 1. In what follows, this paper lets the set N be permuted such that the permuted set
I(N) = {i0, i1, ..., in−1} is such that ix is at least as good a partner as iy with respect to the set
I(N) for x < y.
The example below shows that exclusive partner heterogeneity as in Billand et al
(2011)) also satisfies the Uniform Partner Ranking.
Example 1. Let cij = cj (ie., we assume exclusive partner heterogeneity as in Billand et al (2011)).
Specifically, let N = {1, .., 5} and C = {c1 = 5, c2 = 4, c3 = 3, c4 = 2, c5 = 1}, then clearly C
satisfies Uniform Partner Ranking Property.
It is important to note that if C satisfies the Uniform Partner Ranking Condition, then
the agent i0 can be considered as a common best partner among the set of agents N in the
sense that every agent (except i0) agrees that i0 is the partner that incurs the lowest link
formation cost. In more formal terms,
Definition 3. Let X ⊂ N be a set of agents, then i∗ ∈ X is said to be a Common Best Partner
among all agents in X if cii∗ ≤ cij for all i, j ∈X and i 6= j 6= i∗.
In the same manner as the term “better partner” and “at least as good a partner” are
defined, I define the term “better player” as follows.
Definition 4 (Better Player). Consider a set X ⊂ N and agents i, j ∈ X, i is at least as good
a player as j with respect to the set X if ci,k ≤ cj,k for any k ∈ X, i 6= j 6= k. Moreover, if the
inequality is strict then i is said to be a better player than j with respect to the set X.
Having defined all these terms, I define a restriction that is stronger than Uniform
Partner Ranking as follows.
Definition 5 (Single Community Condition). A cost structure C is said to satisfy Single
Community Condition if the set N can be permuted into the set I(N) = {i0, i1, ..., in−1} such that
ix is at least as good a partner as iy if and only if ix is at least as good a player as iy with respect
to the set I(N) for any x < y.
Example 2. Let cij = ci (ie., we assume exclusive player heterogeneity as in Billand et al (2011)).
Specifically, let N = {1, .., 5} and C = {c1 = 5, c2 = 4, c3 = 3, c4 = 2, c5 = 1}, then we have that
C satisfies Single Community Property.
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I note how Single Community Condition (SCC onwards) may illustrate a realism.
Intuitively, SCC states that if an agent i happens to pay a lower link formation cost than
j regardless to the identity of the agent who behaves as a partner, then every other agent
also prefers to form a link with i than with j in the sense that i incurs a lower information
cost than j. If we think of link formation cost as the physical efforts of an agent in
communicating, and we assume further that this effort depends on language skills. Then
if i has better language skills than j, it is natural to assume that i spends less effort
contacting other agents than j, and other agents also are also likely to prefer contacting i
than j because they know that communication with i is likely to be smoother.
3 Useful Lemmas
In this section I build up several lemmas that are used to prove the main results. The
primary goal is to prove that if a common best partner exists in a component of SNN,
then this component is a branching or Bi∗ , where i∗ is a common best partner. This fact is
further used to prove Proposition 1 and 2 in the next section.
The first lemma guarantees that SNN is minimal, a result that is prevalent in the
literature.
Lemma 1 (SNN is minimal). A component in an SNN is minimal.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose not. Consider a cycle in a non-minimal component, observe
that all agents in it have at least two chains through which they observe one another. In
this cycle, consider an agent who establishes at least one link. If he removes the link, the
component remains unbroken so that he still observes all other agents in the component.
Thus, he is better off removing the link in order to reduce his link formation cost, a
contradiction.
Next, Lemma 2 and 3 show that in a component of SNN a common best partner is
unique, if it exists. Recall that Dj
(
gi,j
)
is defined as a split component that contains j if
the link gi,j is removed.
Lemma 2 (The existence of individual’s best partner). In an SNN, if i accesses j, then ci,j <
ci,k for any agent k that is contained in Dj
(
gi,j
)
and k 6= j.
The proof is trivial and is omitted. Intuitively, if i decides to access an agent in Dj
(
gi,j
)
,
then he chooses an agent that incurs the lowest link formation cost. The fact that our
equilibrium prediction criterion is SNN further necessitates that this agent is unique and
the above inequality is strict. In the proof of the lemma below, the agent j in Dj
(
gi,j
)
is
called unique best partner of i.
Lemma 3 (Existence of Unique Common Best Partner). In a non-empty component of SNN,
if a common best partner among all agents in the component exists, then this component contains
at most one agent that receives more than one link. Moreover, this agent is a unique common best
partner among all agents in the component.
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Proof. Let k be an agent that receives more than one link. Let j1 be an agent that accesses
k. By Lemma 2 we know that k is the best partner of j1 in Dk
(
gj1 ,k
)
. Let j2 be another
agent that accesses k. By Lemma 2 we know that k is also the best partner of j2 in
Dk
(
gj2 ,k
)
. Observe that the union of Dk
(
gj2 ,k
)
and Dk
(
gj1,k
)
contains all agents in the
non-empty component. Thus, k is a common best partner among the set of all agents in
the component.
I now prove that k is a unique common best partner among all agents in the com-
ponent. Suppose not, let k′ be another common best partner. Without loss of generality
let us assume that k′ is contained in Dk
(
gj2,k
)
. Consequently j2 is indifferent between
accessing k and k′ so that this network is not SNN, a contradiction.
Finally, I prove that k is the only agent that receives more than one link. Suppose not,
let k′ be another agent that receives more than one link. Then from the proof above we
know that this agent is a common best partner. However, we have proved earlier that k is
a unique common best partner, a contradiction.
Finally, in what follows I introduce the main lemma of this paper. It characterizes the
shape of a non-empty component in SNN given that a common best partner exists.
Lemma 4 (The Prediction that SNN component is either Bi∗ or branching, through the
existence of Common Best Partner). A non-empty component in SNN is a branching or Bi∗ ,
given that a common best partner (denoted by i∗) exists.
Proof. By Lemma 3, we know that a component of SNN has at most one agent that receives
more than one link. Consequently to complete the prove it suffices to show that 1) if a
component contains no agent that receives more than one link then this component is
branching and, 2) if a component contains exactly one agent that receives more than one
link then this component is a Bi∗ network.
I prove the first part by contradiction. Suppose that the component is not a branching.
Recall that branching is defined as a network such that there is exactly one agent that
receives no link and all other agents receive exactly one link. Consequently if the network
is not a branching there are two cases: (1) the network is such that every agent receives
exactly one link and, (2) the network has more than one agent who receive no link and
every other agent receives exactly one link.
For the first case, consider a terminal agent i. By our presupposition he receives a link
from an agent. Let this agent be j + 1. Observe that j + 1 is not a terminal agent, because
he also receives a link from another agent. Let this agent be j + 2. Again, he is not a
terminal agent for the same reason. Thus, this algorithmic procedure continues infinitely.
It follows that this network has infinite amount of agents, a contradiction.
For the second case, consider agents x and y who receive no link. Since x and y are in
the same component there is a chain between x and y. Let the sequence of agents in this
chain be x, j1, j2, j3, j4, ..., jK , y respectively. Since x is assumed to receive no links, it is the
case that that x accesses j1. Since it is assumed from the beginning the that every agent
receives at most one link, it is the case that j1 accesses j2, j2 accesses j3 and so on. This
follows that jK accesses y, a contradiction to the assumption that y receives no link.
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I now prove the second subsections - if a non-empty component of SNN contains an
agent that receives more than one link then it is a Bi0 network. By Lemma 2, we know
that in such a component there is only one agent that receives more than one link, and
this agent is i∗, a common best partner. Therefore what remains to prove is that i∗ is a
point contrabasis of this component. This in turn requires that I prove that: (i) for each
agent l in this component there exists a path from l to j for some j ∈ Ii∗(g) and, (ii) if
j ∈ Ii∗(g) accesses k 6= i∗ then there is no path from k to j′ ∈ Ii∗(g) and j′ 6= j so that Ii∗\{j}
is not a contrabasis.
To prove that for each l in this component there exists a path from l to j for some
j ∈ Ii∗(g), I introduce the following notations. j′ is such that j′ ∈ Oi∗ . k is such that gj′ ,k = 1
or gj,k = 1. In what follows I consider the following 4 cases depending on the identity of
l: (a) l 6= i∗ and l ∈ Dk(gj,k), (b) l 6= i∗ and l ∈ Dk(gj′ ,k), (c) l 6= i∗ and l /∈ Dk(gj,k), Dk(gj′ ,k)
and, (d) l = i∗.
For case (a), observe that without gj,k the split component Dk(gj,k) is a branching
rooted at k since k receives no link and every other agent receives exactly one link. Con-
sequently for any agent l ∈ Dk(gj,k) for some j ∈ Ii∗ such that gj,k = 1 there is path from l
to j (via k if l 6= k).
Next, I consider case (b). Similar to case (a), observe that without gj′ ,k the split com-
ponent Dk(gj′ ,k) is a branching rooted at k since k receives no link and every other agent
receives exactly one link. Consequently for any such agent l there is a path from l to i∗
(via j′). This in turn guarantees that there is a path from l to any j ∈ Ii∗ (via j′ and i∗).
For case (c), observe that since l 6= i∗, l 6= j and l /∈ Dk(gj,k), Dk(gj′ ,k) it is the case that
l = j′ for some j′ ∈ Oi∗ . This in turn guarantees that there exists a path from l to j (via i∗).
For case (d), since l = i∗ the path from i∗ to an agent j is the link from i∗ to j.
Finally, I prove that if j ∈ Ii∗(g) accesses k 6= i∗ then there is no path from k to j′′ ∈ Ii∗(g)
for j′′ 6= j so that Ii∗\{j} is not a contrabasis. Suppose by contradiction that there is path
from k to j′′. Then k receives more than one link so that k = i∗, a contradiction.
4 Main Result - Equilibrium Characterization
In Lemma 4, the existence of a common best partner in a component of SNN guarantees
that the component is a branching or Bi∗ . Proposition 1 below makes use of this lemma
in the following way. It imposes UPR to guarantee every component contains a common
best partner. This in turn guarantees that every component of SNN is a branching or Bi∗
Proposition 1. Let C satisfy Uniform Partner Ranking Condition and Vi,j flow freely, then every
non-empty component is a branching or Bi∗ .
Proof. Since UPR is satisfied, we know that all agents can be permuted {i0, i1, ..., in−1} so
that ix is at least as good a partner as iy with respect to the set N for x < y. Consequently
in a non-empty component of SNN there exists ix
∗
such that x∗ ≤ y for any iy that is in the
same component. Naturally ix
∗
is i∗, a Common Best Partner in the component. This fact,
which guarantees that every non-empty component of SNN has a Common Best Partner,
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together with Lemma 4 guarantee that every non-empty component is a branching or
Bi∗ .
I remark that Proposition 1 in this paper can be considered as a generalization of
Proposition 1 in Billand et al (2011) and Proposition 3.1 in Galleotti et al (2006). This is
because both exclusive player heterogeneity and exclusive partner heterogeneity in link
formation cost satisfy Uniform Partner Ranking condition. A comparison with Proposi-
tion 1 of Billand et al (2011) is noteworthy. Specifically, a major similarity between the
two propositions is that a non-empty component is a branching or Bi network, and a
major difference is that Proposition 1 in Billand et al (2011) predicts that a non-empty
component is unique, while the Proposition 1 in this paper predicts that SNN can contain
multiple non-empty components. Proposition 2 below aims at eliminating this difference
by imposing a stronger restriction on the cost structure. I remark that despite the fact
that the restriction is stronger, Proposition 2 remains a generalization of Proposition 1 in
Billand et al (2011).
Proposition 2 (SNN with value homogeneity, a single community). Let C satisfy Single
Community Condition and Vi,j = Vj. Then a non-empty Strict Nash network is a minimal network
that has a unique non-empty component that is a Bi0 or a branching.
Proof. Since if C satisfies SCC it also satisfies UPR. It holds true that every non-empty
component is a Bi∗ or branching. Consequently what remains to be proven is that the
non-empty component is unique, and that i∗ = i0
To prove that a non-empty component is unique, I suppose not. Let iA and jA be in
a component, and iB and jB in another component. Assume further that iA accesses jA
and iB accesses jB and, without loss of generality, that iA is at least as friendly as iB. This
entails that iA is at least as good a player as iB so that ciA ,jB ≤ ciB ,jB . Since Vij = Vj, the value
of information that iA receives if he accesses jB is at least equal to the value of information
that iB receives from accessing jB. This fact, together with the fact that ciA ,jB ≤ ciB ,jB , leads
to the conclusion that iA has strictly positive deviation by accessing jB if the network is
SNN, a contradiction.
To prove that i∗ = i0, I first prove that i0 is not in a non-empty component. To do so
suppose by contradiction that i0 is in a non-empty component. Suppose further that i and
j are agents in the non-empty component and that i accesses j0. Since ci0 ,j ≤ ci,j for any i, j
in the network, it follows that i0 has a positive deviation by accessing j, a contradiction.
Finally, since i0 is in the non-empty component it follows by Lemma 3 that i0 = i∗.
I adjourn this section by comparing between Proposition 2 in this paper and Propo-
sition 1 in Billand et al (2011). While both predict that SNN has a unique non-empty
component that is a branching or Bi network, they differ in that Proposition 1 in Billand
et al (2011) further predicts that the unique non-empty contains all agents in the network
so that a non-empty component does not existss. I remark that this difference derives
from the fact that UPR allows for the cost structure such that ci,j 6= ck,j for k 6= j while ex-
clusive partner heterogeneity does not. Intuitively, if i finds that accessing j is profitable,
then exclusive partner heterogeneity predicts that an isolated agent k finds likewise since
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ci,j = ck,j = cj. However, under UPR this reasoning does not apply. Indeed, it can be
the case that cj,k and ck,j are both sufficiently large so that both find that accessing one
another is not profitable.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I provide two propositions that aim to understand the interaction between
player heterogeneity and partner heterogeneity, and how such interaction influences the
properties of SNN. The main conclusions are:
1. Even if ci,j 6= ci and ci,j 6= cj so that two-way heterogeneity is assumed, a non-empty
component of SNN is a branching or Bi so long as all agents in a component of
SNN agree on who the link receiver is that incurs the lowest link formation cost.
Consequently in this paper the prediction of the shape of a non-empty component
in SNN is similar to that of Billand et al (2011), which assumes exclusive partner
heterogeneity. This conclusion is formally stated as Lemma 4.
2. As a result of the conclusion above, if all agents in the network agree on which
agent is at least as good a partner (as measured by a lower link formation cost) than
which then it can be concluded that every non-empty component in this SNN is a
branching or Bi network. This restriction is called Uniform Partner Ranking, and
the prediction of SNN is formally stated as Proposition 1 in this paper.
3. Finally, it can be said that value heterogeneity does not predict the shape of each
component in SNN. Indeed, when an agent i decides whether to form a link in order
to access a component, he weights the benefits of accessing this component against
his link formation cost with the lowest-cost partner in this component. Therefore it
can be concluded that value heterogeneity does not alter his choice of partner.
Naturally, a question that remains is how we can predict the shape and properties
of SNN in the absence of Uniform Partner Ranking. This becomes a potential research
question to explore.
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